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Frugality and Roman Economic Thinking in Varro’s Rerum Rusticarum1 
 
How should we approach the study of  ‘Roman economic thinking’? This has been a surprisingly 
neglected topic in recent years; in part, we may surmise, as a reaction against the stagnation of  the 
debate about ancient economic rationalism and mentality since the 1970s and early 1980s. The different 
doctrinal positions in this debate are familiar, not least because the question of  how far the people of  
classical antiquity thought like us in economic matters has long been at the heart of  wider arguments 
about the nature of  the ancient economy. On the one hand, the ‘modernising’, ‘formalist’ position 
tends simply to assume that the model of  rational utility-maximisation employed in mainstream 
classical economics identifies essential features of  human behaviour, and so can be unproblematically 
extended to pre-modern societies – in practice, often in an unsystematic and unreflective manner.2 On 
the other hand, the observation of  the ‘substantivist’ tradition that this model is not in fact universal, 
and that there are significant differences between ancient and modern conceptions of  such basic 
categories as ‘labour’, ‘money’ and ‘value’, has been taken at times as justification for insisting on an 
absolute distinction between the two societies; this becomes an argument against the use of  any 
modern economic concepts whatsoever, as well as grounds for seeing antiquity as both alien and 
primitive. 3 In neither case is ancient economic mentality taken seriously as a subject in its own right, but 
is conceived simply in positive or negative terms in relation to a taken-for-granted and idealised 
conception of  modern economic rationality.4 
The absence of  any substantial discussion of  economic thought or concepts in the Cambridge 
Economic History of  the Greco-Roman World might be taken as symptomatic of  the recent neglect of  this 
theme. 5 The most charitable explanation is that the volume’s declared focus on the performance of  the 
ancient economy rather than its structure (the latter category including the mental structures that 
influenced economic behaviour) is a justifiable attempt at side-stepping an impossibly polarised 
argument. However, this decision creates the impression that either the editors consider economic 
thought to be irrelevant to the actual operations of  ancient economies, or that they are taking the 
                                                 
1 This paper was originally presented at a conference in Cambridge on Rethinking Roman Frugality, and I am grateful to the 
organisers, Cristiano Viglietti, Ingo Gildenhard and Rebecca Flemming, for that invitation. This version was written in 
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2 Discussed by e.g. Bang 2008 and (more positively) Bresson 2014. 
3 Exemplified by Finley 1999; see the discussions in Jew, Osborne & Scott 2016. 
4 Cf. Carandini 1983. 
5 Scheidel, Morris & Saller 2007: 1-6. 
familiar modernising ideas about human motivation for granted once again  – or, that they believe that 
the impressive performance of  ancient economies in some periods, demonstrated in different chapters 
of  the volume, could only have been achieved if  the Greeks and Romans possessed something close to 
modern economic rationality. More recent accounts, such as Josiah Ober’s modernising interpretation 
of  ancient Greek history, explicitly adopt the neoclassical view of  motivation and mentality as a set of  
“parsimonious microfoundations” on which the analysis can be built, testable in theory but not actually 
tested in practice – thereby again creating the impression that the picture being offered of  economic 
dynamism and ancient entrepreneurship must be attributable at least in part to the rational mentality 
that has been built into the argument from the beginning.6 
Meanwhile, what might be termed a ‘history of  ideas’ approach to the subject, seeking the roots 
of  modern economic concepts in classical thought, largely results in the true but not necessarily helpful 
observation that the ancients had little that resembled the abstract analysis of  modern economics.7 The 
idea that the absence of  an abstract concept of  ‘the economy’ both implies and potentially explains the 
absence of  a complex developed economy is one of  the basic arguments of  Finley’s account – and it 
remains the case, as critics have long observed, that there is no necessary connection between 
economic development and the emergence of  economics as a specialist branch of  knowledge.8 As 
Finley himself  observed, the ancients did pursue a wide range of  activities that we would call 
‘economic’, without having developed that analytical category for themselves; the absence of  such 
theorising is no impediment to productive and profitable activity – and the study of  the ideas and 
concepts that shaped such activity, by determining or influencing the decisions that ancient actors made 
with respect to their expenditure of  energy and resources, cannot be limited to the question of  whether 
(or how) they theorised them. 
 The current neglect of  the theme of  ancient economic thinking (perhaps a better term, if  
‘economic thought’ is too closely associated with formal economics) is a little curious, given that this 
has been one of  the most fertile areas of  contemporary economic research in recent years. Behavioural 
and cultural economics, analysing the actual behaviour of  economic actors (rather than taking the 
simplifying assumptions of  economic modelling to be direct reflections of  reality), and exploring the 
concepts, beliefs and emotions that influence or govern their decisions, have become increasingly 
prominent and influential, especially in the aftermath of  the 2008 financial crash and the subsequent 
critique of  mainstream neoclassical assumptions.9 The ‘parsimonious microfoundations’ of  rational 
                                                 
6 Ober 2015: xvi-xvii; criticised by Vlassopoulos 2016, but with the claim that therefore we should abandon social-scientific 
approaches to the ancient world altogether, and more cogently by Seaford 2016. 
7 Cf. Vivenza 2012, who concludes as a result that Varro’s work has nothing substantial to contribute to the discussion of  
Roman economic thought. In a narrow sense – in terms of  the emergence of  a proto-economics – this is probably true. 
8 Cf. Winch 1996 on the intellectual and cultural roots of  modern political economy. 
9 See for example Kahneman 2000 and 2011; Akerloff  & Shiller 2009. 
actor theory are all in fact being placed in question for modern contexts, let alone for ancient. Of  
course we lack the kinds of  evidence that would enable a detailed study of  Roman decision-making, but 
there is certainly the possibility of  re-reading our sources in the light of  these modern psychological 
studies. Still more, we can adopt an anthropological approach, and take the concepts and assumptions 
of  the Romans seriously in their own terms; not merely as indicators of  whether they should be 
categorised as ‘primitive’ or ‘modern’ in a binary manner, but because these were the mental structures 
and world-views that influenced, if  not determined, their decisions and behaviour.10 This paper seeks to 
explore one small corner of  this new field of  study: the place of  the idea of  ‘frugality’, often taken to 
be a cornerstone of  Roman thought and ideology, in the work of  the first-century BCE agricultural 
writer Varro. 
 
1. Frugality in pastio villatica 
 
The word frugalitas is in fact used just once in Varro’s three dialogues on different aspects of  farming, at 
the beginning of  Book 3, in the course of  his elaboration of  a conceptual framework for understanding 
pastio villatica, the production of  luxury foodstuffs for the urban market.11 There are, the speaker 
(Merula) suggests, three divisions of  this ‘science’ – the aviary, the hare-warren and the fish-pond – 
each of  which is further divided, both into sub-divisions according to specific functional criteria (for 
example, the distinction between fresh- and salt-water ponds) and, according to a general scheme of  
historical development, into past and present forms of  activity: 
Omnibus tribus his generibus sunt bini gradus; superiores, quos frugalitas antiqua, inferiores, quos 
luxuria posterior adiecit. (3.3.6) 
Each of  these three classes has two stages: the earlier, which ancient frugality observed, and the 
later, which modern luxury has now added. 
This rhetorical contrast between ancient frugality and modern luxury echoes the discussion at the 
beginning of  the book, where Varro was concerned to establish pastio villatica as both a distinct and a 
morally acceptable branch of  Roman agriculture. He does this through a complicated argument about 
the true nature of  the villa, or the nature of  the authentic villa, exploring the characteristics of  different 
things that are given that name; it is taken for granted in his discourse that the villa is the basis of  
proper Roman farming and hence of  its virtuous associations, but that raises the question of  what sorts 
of  building can be legitimately given that name, just as in the first book his characters had debated 
                                                 
10 Cf. Viglietti 2011, taking an anthropological approach to the study of  archaic Rome. 
11 On this passage see Nelsestuen 2015: 189-90. On pastio villatica in general, Rinkewitz 1984, Kolendo 1994, Morley 1996: 
86-90. 
whether every activity carried out on the land should count as agri cultura.12 The Villa Publica, where the 
third dialogue takes place, is (says Appius Claudius), more frugal (frugalior) and better (melior) than the 
villa that his interlocutor Axius owns at Reate, which is decorated with citrus wood, elaborate mosaic 
work and the like (3.2.4); further, this villa is the common property of  the citizens and is suitable for 
public business, rather than being private property. Axius counters that his villa is, like those of  their 
grandfathers and great-grandfathers, dedicated to agricultural production, even if  it is also finely 
decorated, whereas the Villa Publica also has paintings and statues, but has never seen a load of  hay or 
a vintage or a grain harvest (3.2.5-6). This in turn gives Appius the opportunity to introduce the 
example of  the villa of  Seius, which has neither pictures and statues nor wine-presses, mills and stables 
– because it is dedicated to the pasturing of  birds, bees and game, which can be just as lucrative (3.2.7-
11) – and his description of  the potential returns from such an enterprise makes Axius eager to learn 
more, leading into the substantive discussion of  the different aspects and techniques of  pastio villatica. It 
is left implicit in this exchange that frugalior has a temporal dimension, contrasting (more virtuous) past 
and (less virtuous) present, but it is certainly being contrasted to luxuria in the same manner as the later 
remark, not least in the evocation of  such familiar tropes of  Roman luxury as citrus-wood.13 
 If  we follow the conventional view that frugalitas is one of  the basic virtues of  the ancestors in 
Roman tradition – and if  we recognise that Varro’s work is much more than a simple technical manual, 
with at the very least a significant philosophical and moralising strand – then the relative absence of  the 
concept from the work may initially seem surprising.14 One possible explanation is that frugality was 
understood by the Romans primarily in terms of  consumption, and so has only a subsidiary role in any 
discussion of  production: frugality is about the absence of  decoration, the limitation of  expenditure on 
unnecessary things; it is the antonym of  luxury, the avoidance of  any behaviour that might threaten to 
waste a Roman aristocrat’s patrimony. The problem with modern pastio villatica, from this perspective, is 
that introducing such activities into the villa may become a form of  luxury, rather than ensuring that 
the estate remains dedicated to utility and profit as much as to pleasure (as Varro defines the correct 
approach to farming at 1.4.1, following on from 1.2.12. The remainder of  the third book offers many 
examples of  such a contrast between productive activities and those that become a form of  
consumption: between aviaries constructed for pleasure and those constructed for utility (3.4.2 – going 
on to recount a failed attempt by Lucullus at combining the two by having his guests dine within the 
                                                 
12 Compare the discussion at the beginning of  Book 1 (1.2.13-24) about whether mining or clay-pits or tavern-keeping 
carried out on the land can be considered as ‘farming’, with Marzano 2015 on the range of  activities carried out on villas; 
see Nelsestuen 2015: 43-4 on Varro’s overall concern with the systematisation and demarcation of  the different branches of  
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2007 (with a summary account in Diederich 2005), Kronenberg 2007 and Nelsestuen 2015. 
aviary, where they could watch birds at the same time as eating them), and salt-water fish-ponds that 
cost as much to run, let alone construct, as they brought in from the sale of  the fish (3.17.3). 
Whether we interpret Varro’s work as a ‘mirror of  virtues’ for the landed elite, as Silke 
Diederich has suggested, or as a deliberate attempt at rationalising new forms of  activity and new 
sources of  profit in terms of  the traditional Republican elite value system, as Grant Nelsestuen argues, 
pastio villatica is a topic that requires careful negotiation from the beginning. It blurs the conceptual 
boundary between production and consumption (at least in some of  its contemporary forms), and so 
requires a certain amount of  intellectual work for a Roman author to claim it as a legitimate activity for 
a respectable member of  the elite and hence as a legitimate subject for consideration. ‘Frugality’ is a key 
Roman moral concept for such a project; it is necessary for defenders of  such practices to argue that 
such a deviation from ancient frugalitas does not necessarily lead one into deplorable luxuria, so long as 
the expenditure on aviaries, fish-ponds and game reserves can still be justified in terms of  their 
financial return.15 Conversely, the absence of  any mention of  frugalitas in the first two books of  Varro’s 
work may be easily explained by the fact that the discussions of  agrarian cultivation and conventional 
pasturing are unproblematically focused on production rather than consumption. Growing grain or 
herding sheep is unlikely to lead a member of  the Roman elite to indulge in excessive expenditure on 
illegitimate pleasures; only pastio villatica threatens to undermine the traditional moral categories. 
 This problem looks rather different if  we put in question whether frugalitas is actually the age-
old Roman virtue, of  more or less fixed and traditional meaning and connotations, that it is often 
assumed to be (not least by Diederich and Nelsestuen, who seem to take it as part of  a fixed 
background of  established Roman values against which a given practice or act can be measured).16 If  
frugalitas was instead a relatively recent coinage in Varro’s time, closely associated with Cicero’s 
‘invention’ (with a clear political and cultural agenda) of  a complex of  ‘traditional’ Roman values that is 
projected back onto the imagined/imaginary virtuous past, then the absence of  the term from most of  
Varro’s work needs little explanation. The passages in which Varro does use related terms (or effectively 
implies the same moralising agenda, as in the various examples of  unacceptable or misconceived pastio 
villatica) need then to be considered from a different perspective: his characters are depicted not simply 
evaluating some relatively new and potentially problematic agricultural practices against a fixed 
backdrop of  established elite values and expectations, but simultaneously exploring the nuances and 
ambiguities of  this new moral category against a backdrop of  existing (if  not necessarily well-
established) practices. The Romans, according to this newly invented moral tradition, have always been 
frugal, but they still need to determine what this means, and what the implications are for their 
economic behaviour. 
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16 Gildenhard forthcoming. 
  The complexity, and indeed incoherence, of  the term luxuria as the antonym of  frugalitas has 
long been recognised.17 There is no fixed or objective standard for what constitutes ‘luxury’, in Rome or 
in any other society, let alone a neutral and apolitical definition; rather, almost any given action is more 
or less open to the accusation that it is, in some sense, luxurious. We could read the opening section of  
Varro’s third dialogue as a similar critique or exploration of  the concept of  frugalitas, revealing it to be 
more complicated than it first appears. The political implications of  this debate are made explicit in the 
contrast between the frugal, communal Villa Publica (associated with political activity and military 
service) and the private villa estate (associated with individual, anti-social pleasure) – but are 
immediately problematised, both by questioning whether that communal frugality is actually as useful as 
it pretends (since it does not involve the production of  goods that Roman society needs) and by 
exposing the confusion around the identification and definition of  frugality. Is it the presence or 
absence of  statues, paintings, mosaics and citrus-wood in a given building that determines whether or 
not it counts as ‘frugal’ – or is it the purpose for which the building exists and the activities that take 
place there? Is the definition linked to the very conventional contrast of  virtuous countryside and 
luxurious city, or can a country villa be wholly unproductive (effectively, a piece of  the city in the 
middle of  the countryside) and hence the opposite of  frugal?18 Is frugality necessarily an ancient virtue, 
if  new-fangled forms of  pastio villatica – which may seem to be thoroughly luxurious in contrast to the 
practices of  the ancestors – can be shown to be wholly productive activities, both economically (in 
terms of  the profit to be drawn from them) and socially (since they help support such social occasions 
as triumphs and the dinners of  the collegia)? 
What these two short passages in Varro show is that it depends on what you mean by frugality, 
which is thus revealed to be not in fact a useful means of  evaluating the activities of  the landed elite. 
Varro’s account of  the concept effectively offers a critique of  the Ciceronian moral agenda; frugalitas 
works as a term of  analysis and moral evaluation only if  you don’t think about it too much or try to 
define it too precisely, or only if  it is not tested against reality.19 This is just one minor strand in the 
complex architecture of  Varro’s work, its blurring of  generic boundaries and combination of  satirical, 
philosophical and practical elements as a means of, among other things, commenting on Roman 
moralising and political discourse as well as participating in it. 
 
                                                 
17 Edwards 1993: 137-72 on luxuria, and 201-2 on frugalitas; passim on Roman moral discourse and its political dimension. 
More generally on the idea of  luxury in the early modern period and its earlier antecedents, Berry 1994, Morley 1998. 
18 Which might also bring to mind a later iteration of  this debate, when the younger Pliny claims that his suburban retreat is 
more productive than his farms because he is able to write there: Ep. 4.6. 
19 Kronenberg (2009: 102-7) reaches a similar conclusion about Varro’s ironic moralising and satire on Cicero by a different 
route, focusing on the internal contradictions and hypocrisy of  Appius’ contribution to the dialogue rather than on the 
contradictions of  the moral terminology. 
2. Controlling expenditure 
 
Considered in this way, Varro’s few uses of  frugalitas and related terms can offer a small contribution 
both to the interpretation of  his overall philosophical-political agenda and to our understanding of  
moralising debates in the late Republic. For the rest of  this paper, I want to offer a different 
perspective, focused on the wider complex of  ideas to which frugalitas may be related – by modern 
observers, even if  not by the Romans themselves.20 A concern with the control and management of  
expenditure is certainly not confined in Roman thought to issues related to consumption, as seems to 
be the case with frugalitas; on the contrary, it is also recognised as central to the processes of  agricultural 
production. Indeed, one might suggest that Cicero’s moral-philosophical project can succeed precisely 
because it is piggy-backing on an established set of  elite values and assumptions, more closely related to 
the process of  actual economic activity, which he draws upon in constructing his discourse of  frugalitas. 
A concern with the management of  expenditure is unmistakable in the case of  Cato’s earlier 
work on agriculture, and his notorious insistence that the landowner should cut costs at every possible 
opportunity.21 
Sell your oil, if  it has a price, wine, sell surplus grain; worn-out oxen, blemished cattle, blemished 
sheep, wool, hides, an old wagon, old tools, an old slave, a sickly slave, and whatever else is surplus. 
It is appropriate for the paterfamilias to be a seller not a buyer. (2.7) 
This passage is the culmination of  a series of  injunctions about the need for the landowner to monitor 
and manage costs. The list begins with the acquisition of  a farm, where Cato advises careful 
observation of  the situation and the neighbours – ‘it should lie among farms which do not often 
change owners, where those who have sold farms are sorry to have done so’ (1.4) – as well as indicators 
of  its current performance, such as whether there are numerous oil presses and wine vats on the 
premises: ‘where there are not, know that the yield/return (fructus) is in proportion’ (1.5). 
The farm should not have much equipment, but be well situated. See that the equipment is not 
minimal and the land not extravagant (sumptuosus). Know that a farm is like a man, however 
productive/lucrative (quaestuosus), if  it is extravagant then not much is left over. (1.6) 
Cato’s advice for the owner on visiting his estate is similarly focused on cost – and the risk of  
unnecessary costs, waste, or underemployment of  resources. The owner should inspect the farm 
himself  to see what work has been completed and what remains to be done, and demand a full 
reckoning from the vilicus of  work completed, work still to do and crop yields; he should then make a 
                                                 
20 These perspectives are therefore by no means exclusive. 
21 On Cato’s work, see Diederich 2009: 157-72 on its literary qualities, “between orality and literature”, and 273-97 on mos 
maiorum and Machtpolitik. Habinek 1998: 60-4 on Cato’s written style and attitude to Greek culture. 
calculation of  the labourers and the time involved which can be used to hold the vilicus to account (2.1-
2). Cato summarises the expected excuses for underperformance – the weather, illness, runaway slaves, 
demands on the labour force for public works – and offers a prepared response: there are always things 
that could have been done, even on rainy days and festivals, and sick slaves should be given reduced 
rations (2.3-4). Following this interrogation, the owner should inspect all the different rationes (a term 
which here seems to mean ‘calculations’ or ‘totals’, but certainly involves a written record of  purchases, 
sales, outstanding balances and surplus produce): cash, grain, fodder, wine and oil (1.5).22 Surplus 
livestock, wine and grain should be sold, as should oil if  the price is right (oil can be stored for longer 
than the other goods if  there’s a glut on the market) – which then leads to the list quoted above of  
other superfluous items that should be disposed of  (1.7). 
 Most of  these injunctions imply calculations, estimates and assumptions about the future, 
without offering any detail about how the owner should go about making them: how to determine what 
grain is surplus to the need to keep the workforce fed, given the risk of  a poor harvest; how to 
determine whether a slave is morbosus – chronically prone to illness and hence a liability – rather than 
just suffering from a temporary illness; how to decide at what age a slave becomes old enough that they 
no longer earn their keep – but young enough still to fetch a reasonable price. Tools are treated in a 
similar manner, to be sold rather than thrown out – implying, unless Cato is being hopelessly optimistic, 
that there is still some use to be made of  them but that new tools will contribute more to the 
productivity of  the estate and its workers. What should be stressed here is that Cato’s advice does not 
fit the caricature of  the sort of  miserliness that will use things until they fall apart in order to delay the 
expense of  replacement (unlike some later passages, where he insists on using only windfalls and old 
olives as food for the familia, and on using old clothes for patchwork: 58-9); he is conscious of  the risk 
of  false economies. The nature of  his text is that it offers bullet points and prompts rather than full 
instructions – and, while that prevents us from reconstructing his calculations in full, it is enough to 
indicate his priorities: an obsessive concern with controlling costs, certainly, fuelled by a permanent 
suspicion of  the laziness and dishonesty of  slaves and their overseers and a fear of  anything that might 
be labelled extravagance, but also an awareness of  the need to invest (buying a well-managed farm at 
the outset rather than a run-down bargain, choosing the right moment to buy new tools and healthy 
slaves and sell the old ones, ensuring that the estate has all the supplies it needs), provided that this is 
always kept within the bounds of  sensible expenditure. 
 Varro’s work is often presented as being far more sophisticated than Cato’s, in its content and 
outlook as well as in its literary form and weight of  learning. When it comes to the theme of  costs, 
expenditure and returns, however, it falls squarely within the same tradition, even if  it pursues these 
issues less obsessively. Varro’s stated aim at the beginning of  book 1 is to teach his wife how to make a 
                                                 
22 On the written records of  estate management from Roman Egypt, see Rathbone 1991. 
newly-purchased estate fruitful/profitable (fructuosum) through good cultivation (1.1.2). When the 
dialogue begins, the key question posed to Scrofa, the recognised authority within the group of  
characters, is whether agriculture has as its end (summa) utility, pleasure or both; Scrofa turns initially to 
the question, discussed above, of  how true agriculture is to be defined, making it clear that not every 
source of  fructus based on the land falls within the definition (e.g. 1.2.21, 1.2.23), but then offers a clear 
statement of  principle: 
Equipped with this knowledge, farmers should aim at two goals, at utility and pleasure [ad utilitatem et 
voluptatem]. Utility aims at fruitfulness/profit [fructum], pleasure at enjoyment; that which is useful 
takes priority over that which is pleasurable. And yet those methods of  cultivation which improve 
the appearance of  the land, not only make it more fruitful, as in the cultivation of  fruit trees or olive 
trees in rows, but also more saleable, and add to the value of  the farm. For any man would rather 
pay a high sum for a piece of  land that is attractive than for one which is fruitful but unsightly. Still 
more useful is a piece of  land which is healthier than others, because there the return is certain; on 
the other hand, in a farm that is pestilential, however fertile it is, calamity prevents the farmer from 
making a profit. For where the calculation is with death, not only is the return uncertain, but also the 
life of  the farmers. Where there is no healthfulness, farming is nothing other than a roll of  the die 
for the life and property of  the owner. (1.4.1-2) 
Agriculture has two goals – but in most cases, Varro claims, these are compatible and mutually 
supportive, if  not one and the same; this is the same set of  values that governs the later judgement on 
pastio villatica, where the possibility of  deriving pleasure from the consumptive aspect of  such activities 
does not necessarily work against the profits to be derived from them. We might note a certain 
confusion, or inconsistency (which may be deliberate, if  we follow Kronenberg’s view that the entire 
work is satirical), as to whether the value of  a piece of  land is derived from its actual fruitfulness and 
ability to deliver a return or simply from the price it can make in the market. Does a statement of  fact 
that no one would pay more for land which is productive but unsightly than for an attractive plot (1.4.2) 
necessarily represent an endorsement of  that set of  priorities?23 However, throughout Varro’s work the 
speakers focus consistently on the returns to be realised from different activities on the estate (rather 
than directly on the realisable value of  the estate itself), and the underlying assumption is that farming 
is all about the techniques to be used to obtain material benefits on an ongoing basis. 
 Varro’s characters are less ostentatiously concerned than Cato was with reducing costs as a 
means of  guaranteeing these returns – but they do show awareness of  risk and uncertainty, and the 
need for rational calculation. This applies most obviously to the initial choice of  a farm, but also to the 
ways in which it is managed: 
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The Italian seems to have had two things particularly in mind in his farming: whether the land would 
yield a reasonable return for the expense and labour, and whether the situation was healthy or not. 
If  either of  these elements is lacking, any man who nevertheless desires to farm has lost his wits, 
and should be taken in charge by his family, For no sane man should be willing to undertake the 
outlay and expenditure of  farming if  he sees that it cannot be recouped; or, supposing that he can 
raise a crop, if  he sees that it will be destroyed by the unwholesomeness of  the situation. (1.2.8) 
In a similar manner, in the passage quoted above (1.4.2), farming in adverse circumstances is compared 
to gambling, not only with profit but with the lives of  the cultivators (which are of  course to a great 
extent the same thing in an estate managed using slave labour), and Scrofa goes on to argue that the 
science of  agriculture can do much to reduce or modify these risks: 
And yet science may reduce this. For granted that healthfulness, which comes from climate and soil, 
is not in our power but in that of  nature, nevertheless it depends greatly on us, because we are able, 
with effort, to reduce the evil effects. For if  the farm is unwholesome because of  the land or the 
water, from the miasma which is exhaled in some places; or if  on account of  the climate the land is 
too hot or the wind is not salubrious, these faults can be alleviated by the science and the investment 
of  the owner. (1.4.4) 
Roman agriculture is haunted by a concern that expenditure, both initial investment and ongoing costs, 
may not be justified by the returns; the task of  the agronomists is to help their readers manage such 
risks and uncertainty. Cato focuses on the tight control of  the whole enterprise, and implies the need 
for careful judgement about the right moment to spend or to invest. Varro’s speakers put more faith in 
the knowledge gained from the advancement of  agricultural science as a basis for better decision-
making; for example, reducing risk through the right investment – for example, in the situation, or the 
layout of  the farm buildings – at the outset, but also through the manner in which the estate will be 
managed. As Scrofa remarks in passing, the science of  agriculture is also concerned with maximising 
returns in the long term (perpetuo) (1.3).24 
 This is not ‘frugality’ in the narrow sense, either as the term is used in Varro’s third book or as 
set out by Cicero. It bears a certain resemblance to parsimonia, as later defined by Seneca, ‘the science of  
avoiding unnecessary expenditure or the art of  using one’s income with moderation’ (De Beneficiis 
2.34.4). Here too, however, the emphasis of  the definition seems to be too strongly focused on 
consumption and the manner of  one’s lifestyle, rather than on the careful balance between investment 
and returns that concern the agronomists – not to mention the fundamental problem of  determining 
whether a given cost will turn out to be justified, and of  identifying the right moment to sell, buy or 
                                                 
24 Cf. Nelsestuen 2011 on Scrofa’s overall approach to agronomy. 
invest.25 In other words, what we find in these discussions is not a moral/philosophical/political 
discourse wholly removed from practice concerns – though there are certainly elements of  this in 
Cato’s thought and in the complex, multi-layered conversations of  Varro’s work – but rather a set of  
practical concerns and principles that both reflect the realities of  agricultural production and must have 
influenced the decisions that Roman landowners took about the management of  their estates. 
 
3. ‘Roman economic thinking’ 
 
The modern tradition of  reading Varro solely as a source of  straightforward factual information about 
Roman farming, and somehow failing to notice literary/rhetorical features of  the text such as the 
dialogue form, the humorous names of  the characters or the very specific historical settings of  the 
three books, has now finally been abandoned. However, there is a risk of  heading to the opposite 
extreme of  seeing it as a wholly literary or intellectual exercise with no connection to the realities of  
farming, as Kronenberg does. It seems preferable to follow Diederich and Nelsestuen in seeing a hybrid 
form – a ‘philosophico-satirico-technical dialogue’, as the latter puts it – and in emphasising the 
complex and literary nature of  most ancient technical writing.26 Varro’s text does engage with the ‘real 
world’ of  Italian agriculture and with the practicalities of  estate management – even, at times, at the 
expense of  ‘dissonance’ between these pragmatic elements and his more direct engagements with 
contemporary philosophical and political issues.27 The problem for the purposes of  reconstructing 
Roman economic thinking is the extent to which Varro’s deployment of  what we can call ‘economic’ 
concepts and principles is self-conscious and multi-layered; not merely reflecting Roman values and 
attitudes but exploring and criticising them. His work can never be taken at face value; certain passages 
are over-determined – as Diederich suggests, they can be seen as a staging (Inszenierung) of  Roman 
economic behaviour for the purposes of  critique as much as pedagogy – and so demand a multi-
faceted interpretation.28 But it seems reasonable to conclude that this self-conscious sophistication and 
even playfulness is an essential feature of  Roman thinking about economic matters, in contrast to 
modern attempts at developing a form of  analysis that excludes everything beyond a narrow, 
instrumentalised agenda. 
 What then can we draw from the examples discussed above of  Roman concern with costs and 
expenditure in farming? It is relatively easy to ‘modernise’ such statements by presenting them in terms 
of  a concern with profit that becomes the motive for the rational employment of  resources in order to 
                                                 
25 There is clearly scope for exploring the possible connections to or overlaps with virtues like prudentia and providentia. 
26 Nelsestuen 2015: 11. Generally on technical literature, Fögen 2015. 
27 ‘Dissonance’ is Nelsestuen’s term: 2015: 3. 
28 2007: 180. 
maximise returns. This is especially the case if, as in the Loeb edition, the Latin term fructus is 
predominantly translated as ‘profit’, obscuring its more complex (and less modern) connotations such 
as the actual harvest and the general fruitfulness of  the land as much as any monetary benefit; if  we 
want a single English translation, ‘returns’ or ‘yield’ might better represent the various senses and 
potential ambiguity of  the Latin word. In other respects, too, we need to be careful not to make a direct 
equation between the acquisitiveness of  the Roman land-owning elite and the assumptions of  modern 
rational actor theory, without thinking this through in detail. The Romans had only limited ideas of  
capital investment as a source of  greater profit in the longer term; the discussions in the agronomists 
are mostly focused on the start-up costs of  the agricultural enterprise, rather than its ongoing 
enhancement. Further, a strategy of  limiting costs wherever possible may be self-defeating in the longer 
term, or at the very least rules out various potentially profitable strategies. Again, what is important in 
this project is to understand Roman categories and patterns of  thought in their own terms, rather than 
seeking immediately to associate them with modern assumptions or to insist on the opposite. 
Finally, it should be emphasised again that fructus was not the only stated or implied goal of  
farming for the Romans. For Cato, farming is simply a better and more moral way to make a living, 
besides being less risky than trading (an idea which sits slightly awkwardly with his subsequent 
obsession with the insecurity of  agricultural incomes unless costs are controlled...). Meanwhile, Varro’s 
characters retain (or assert) some sense that farming is more virtuous and more Roman than other 
sources of  income, by seeking to limit the range of  activities deemed to be appropriate for the farmer; 
not all profit is necessarily regarded as equal, while at the same time non-material gains (voluptas) are 
claimed as legitimate ends of  agricultural activity. If  we define the ends of  farming very loosely as 
‘utility’, which can include social capital and individual pleasure as well as material returns, then the 
authors’ statements echo modern assumptions about human motivation – but at the risk of  becoming a 
truism. It may be more productive to read these statements in terms of  different expressed preferences, 
which are not fully or consistently substitutable, and not necessarily well defined. If  we accept the basic 
picture conveyed by Cato and Varro as a reflection of  actual Roman thinking about decisions on 
production, then the criteria used by the Romans to evaluate different courses of  action, including 
calculations of  risk and expectations about the future, are not solely financial or even utilitarian. 
 That suggests a second way of  considering the attitudes and assumptions revealed by these 
statements and costs and expenditure: we can understand these authors’ focus on cost management and 
control as an entirely rational response to conditions of  uncertainty, reflecting an overall concern with 
the sustainability of  the economic enterprise in a highly unpredictable environment. The Mediterranean 
can be seen, as Horden and Purcell characterise it, as unified by its fragmented and unpredictable 
nature, with a climate defined by the high degree of  variability from season to season, from year to year 
and between different microregions.29 The Roman agronomists certainly conceived their climate in such 
terms, and were well aware of  the consequences for agricultural practice in different regions (see e.g. 
1.6.2-3), insisting on the need to vary such things as sowing and harvesting times according to local 
conditions, and making adjustments to the timing of  different activities depending on the weather – so 
that even apparently invariable rules may be set aside “if  a necessary reason compels you” (1.34.1).30 
Further, they show clear awareness of  the impact of  changing market conditions on the profitability of  
the villa’s products, from Cato deciding whether or not the price is right for selling oil to the 
recognition in Varro’s third dialogue of  the dependence of  pastio villatica on specific activities in the city 
of  Rome, closely related to peculiar historical circumstances which cannot be assumed to be 
permanent. Farming – and especially farming orientated directly towards the market and its new 
opportunities – is an uncertain business, even if  trade may be considered still riskier. The aim of  the 
new science of  agriculture is to help manage this risk, by increasing the farmer’s knowledge of  different 
environmental, market and political conditions and of  how to adjust practices to take advantage of  
them or alleviate disadvantages – not  least so that a wider range of  estates in different regions can be 
transformed into viable enterprises.31 Cost management – reducing exposure to risk – can be seen as 
part of  the range of  techniques that writers like Varro seek to put at the landowner’s disposal. 
 Thirdly, we have to acknowledge how far these texts offer a self-conscious commentary on the 
dilemmas faced by members of  the Roman elite, exploring and examining the role of  traditional 
Roman values of  thrift and risk aversion in the face of  unprecedented new conditions and 
opportunities. What we see in Varro’s Book 3 is the potential flexibility of  Roman economic 
conceptions, which are able (with some intellectual ingenuity on Varro’s part) to encompass activities 
that seem on the face of  it to contradict inherited values. The character of  Axius in particular shows 
the dangers of  an all-encompassing obsession with gain driven by and dependent on the new wealth of  
Rome – it is entirely appropriate that he knows all about fish-ponds, the most resource-intensive and 
hence risky element of  the resource-intensive and risky pastio villatica portfolio. But this moral and 
political perspective does not invalidate the practical advice offered by Varro’s characters; rather, it 
shows the potential dangers of  technical advice that is completely separated from a framework of  
values and that pays insufficient attention to issues of  risk and sustainability. Varro’s account offers a 
justification for the continuing relevance of  traditional practices and conceptions, if  properly evaluated 
(hence his willingness to question the idea of  frugalitas) and deployed as practical wisdom rather than 
abstract, inflexible principles. The traditional Roman emphasis on cost management and calculation is 
                                                 
29Horden & Purcell 2000: 78. Generally on climate, Cheyette 2014. 
30Kronenberg (2009: 91) suggests rather that this is part of  Varro's satire of  Ciceronian philosophy, showing the inability of  
human ars to overcome nature. 
31Compare Garnsey 1988: 48-55 on different means of  reducing risk in ancient grain cultivation. 
shown to be still applicable to new economic and political conditions, and capable of  being adapted to 
cover new practices – but it also serves as a site for debate about the state of  contemporary society and 
its values. As we would expect, Roman economic thinking remained thoroughly embedded in Roman 
social, political and cultural life. 
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